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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                
 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 I.  Introduction 
 On April 26, 1994, a federal grand jury returned a 
multi-count indictment charging Theresa J. Bush with five counts 
of making false statements in connection with the acquisition of 
a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) (the false 
statement counts), and five counts of possession of a firearm by 
a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (the 
possession counts).  On July 13, 1994, Bush plead guilty to one 
false statement count and one possession count.  However, Bush 
stipulated to having committing the other eight charged offenses, 
and "agree[d] that, for the purpose of determining [her] 
Sentencing Guidelines range, . . . these additional offenses 
shall be treated as if the [she] had been convicted of additional 
counts charging these offenses."  App. 14. 
  
 The prosecutor and the defense attorney submitted 
sentencing memorandums addressing two issues to the district 
court:  (1) which Sentencing Guidelines Manual applies to Bush's 
sentence; and (2) how the multiple counts should be grouped.  At 
the October 14, 1994, sentencing hearing the prosecutor conceded 
that because of potential ex post facto problems, the 1990 
Guidelines Manual should apply.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1403 (3d Cir. 1994) (although 
"[g]enerally, the sentencing court must apply the Guidelines 
Manual in effect at the time of sentencing . . . '[w]here such 
retroactivity results in harsher penalties, Ex Post Facto Clause 
problems arise, and courts must apply the earlier version.'") 
(citation omitted).1  The district court then divided the offense 
conduct into three separate groups, and, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 
3D1.4, computed Bush's offense level to be 13.2   
 The district court thereupon sentenced Bush to 
concurrent 16-month custodial terms, to be followed by concurrent 
3-year terms of supervised release.  On October 21, 1994, Bush 
                     
1
.  The 1990 Guidelines Manual was in effect at the time Bush 
committed the crimes to which she pleaded guilty.  The 1993 
Guidelines Manual is substantially different with respect to 
firearms offenses, but those differences are not relevant here.  
In this opinion our citations are to the 1990 manual.  
2
.  The relevant firearms guideline, section 2K2.1(a)(2), 
provided a base offense level of 12.  When three groups are 
created that charge equally serious offenses, section 3D1.4 
directs a court to increase the offense level by 3 which the 
district court did.  The court then subtracted 2 levels pursuant 
to section 3E1.1 because it found that Bush had accepted 
responsibility for her criminal conduct.  Thus, the district 
court computed the offense level to be 13. 
  
filed a timely notice of appeal of her sentence.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 
3742(a).  The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  We will affirm. 
 
 II.  Discussion  
 The sole issue on this appeal is whether the district 
court erred in dividing the offense conduct into three groups.  
"This contention requires a construction of the guidelines so 
that our scope of review . . . is plenary."  United States v. 
Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289, 1304 (3d Cir. 1991).  Of course, we 
review the district court's findings of fact leading to its 
grouping determination only for clear error. 
 Section 3D1.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines directs 
courts to combine multiple counts of conviction into "'distinct 
Groups of Closely Related Counts'" when certain criteria are met. 
United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d at 1401 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 
3D1.1(a)).  This practice of "grouping," as it has come to be 
called, was designed "to prevent multiple punishment for 
substantially identical offense conduct, while still ensuring 
incremental punishment for significant additional criminal 
conduct."  United States v. Wessells, 936 F.2d 165, 168 (4th Cir. 
1991).  In accommodating these concerns, courts must distinguish 
between occasions when increasing the punishment for an 
additional count would punish the defendant for conduct taken 
into account in another count and those occasions when the added 
counts reflect additional criminal culpability.  The guidelines 
  
provide in this regard that "[a]ll counts involving substantially 
the same harm shall be grouped together into a single Group", 
U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2, and define "substantially the same harm" as 
follows: 
 (a) When counts involve the same victim and 
the same act or transaction. 
 
 (b) When counts involve the same victim and 
two or more acts or transactions connected by 
a common criminal objective or constituting 
part of a common scheme or plan. 
 
 (c) When one of the counts embodies conduct 
that is treated as a specific offense 
characteristic in, or other adjustment to, 
the guideline applicable to another of the 
counts. 
 
 (d) When the offense level is determined 
largely on the basis of the total amount of 
harm or loss, the quantity of a substance 
involved, or some other measure of aggregate 
harm, or if the offense behavior is ongoing 
or continuous in nature and the offense 
guideline is written to cover such behavior. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2.  While section 3D1.2 contains lists of specific 
offenses that should and should not be grouped, firearm offenses 
fall into neither category.  Therefore, in firearms cases "a case 
by case determination must be made based upon the facts of the 
case and the applicable guidelines (including specific offense 
characteristics and other adjustments) used to determine the 
offense level."  Section 3D1.2(d).  We previously have noted the 
relevance of application note 2 to firearms offenses, which 
provides that when crimes involve "indirect or secondary victims 
'the grouping decision must be based primarily upon the nature of 
  
the interest invaded by each offense.'"  United States v. 
Riviere, 924 F.2d at 1304 (citing U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2). 
 The parties do not dispute the facts constituting the 
offense conduct:  On ten occasions between September 29, 1990, 
and November 29, 1990, Bush travelled to Lou's Loan of Upper 
Darby, Pennsylvania, a licensed gun dealer.  On five of those 
trips she applied to buy various handguns, and in so doing, 
failed to acknowledge a prior felony conviction.  On the other 
five trips she purchased the guns for which she had applied.   
 The district court grouped each false statement count 
with its corresponding possession count; after that grouping, the 
district court chronicled Bush's actions as follows: 
 10/04/90: Bush purchases her first handgun,a 
.32 New England revolver. 
 
 10/12/90: Bush purchases her second handgun, 
a .380 caliber Davis semi-
automatic; 
 
 10/13/90 Bush purchases her third handgun, a 
9mm caliber Taurus semi-automatic; 
 
 11/01/90 Bush purchases her fourth handgun, 
a .380 caliber Beretta semi-
automatic; 
 
 11/29/90 Bush purchases three .380 caliber 
Davis semi-automatic handguns and 
one 9 mm caliber Tanfoglio semi-
automatic handgun. 
 
 Then the court analyzed which of the offenses were 
distinct and which were coextensive and therefore involved 
substantially the same harm.  Beginning with the premise that if 
Bush bought the guns for different purposes then different harms 
  
were involved, the court reviewed the record and determined that 
she had given inconsistent explanations for the purchases.  On 
December 4, 1992 she informed agents of the Bureau of Alcohol 
Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) that she bought the guns because she 
and her husband liked to target shoot at "Colosimo's range," see 
PSR at 2 ¶ 7.3  But she told the probation officer during the 
presentence investigation that she bought the guns as protection 
for her mother and sisters.  See PSR at 2 ¶ 10.  The district 
court partially believed Bush's explanations, but concluded that 
"these lawful purposes only account for four of the guns.  They 
cannot plausibly explain the purchase of four additional semi-
automatic weapons on November 29, 1990."  Op. at 6.  The court 
thus inferred that there was a third "mystery motive" for the 
purchases. 
 Additionally, relying on the chart quoted above, the 
court characterized Bush's gun-purchasing activity as naturally 
dividing into three time frames:  October 4 through October 13, 
1990; November 1, 1990; and November 29, 1990.  Reasoning that 
while in a broad sense Bush's purchases could be considered 
"ongoing, . . . their temporal separation cannot fairly be 
regarded as continuous,"  op. at 7, the court concluded that 
"[t]he timing and manner of Bush's purchases confirms our 
creation of three groups."  Op. at 6.  The district court found 
                     
3
.  At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel offered no 
objections to the factual findings in the PSR, other than to the 
probation officer's conclusion that the 1993 Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual should apply.  App. 66. 
  
still further support for its grouping decision in its 
observation that "the handguns . . . are of three different 
calibers and from five different manufacturers."  Op. at 6. 
 Bush first argues that the general thrust of the 
guidelines supports a single group.  In this regard, she points 
to the application note to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 for the proposition 
that firearms offenses presumptively should be grouped together.  
That application note states: 
 Subsection (d) likely will be used with the 
greatest frequency.  It provides that most 
property crimes . . ., firearms offenses, and 
other crimes where the guidelines are based 
primarily on quantity or contemplate 
continuing behavior are to be grouped 
together.  The list of instances in which 
this subsection should be applied is not 
exhaustive. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 application note 6.   
 Bush's reliance is misplaced.  Immediately following 
the application note, the guideline contains examples of when 
grouping is appropriate which shed light on the point the 
Sentencing Commission was making in the application note.  The 
pertinent example states that if "[t]he defendant is convicted of 
three counts of unlicensed dealing in firearms . . . [a]ll three 
counts are to be grouped together."  Suppose, for example, a 
defendant, unlicensed to deal in firearms, owns a pawn shop and 
has three guns for sale.  It might be unfair to increase the 
punishment for each additional gun, because the shopowner really 
was running a single business and engaged in a single continuous 
course of conduct.  Dividing the crime into three subdivisions 
  
artificially would increase the punishment based not on 
additional criminal conduct but on the fortuity of the number of 
guns being sold.  That is precisely the type of result against 
which grouping is intended to guard, and it is the kind of 
situation covered by the application note. 
 But that grouping principle cannot be applied to all 
multiple firearms violations, for such an application would 
eviscerate the Commission's direction that such crimes are to be 
grouped on a case by case basis.  Moreover, it defies logic to 
say that all firearms violations committed by an individual in a 
narrow time frame necessarily involve substantially the same harm 
and invade the same protected interests.  People possess firearms 
for various reasons with various intentions.  While, broadly 
speaking, society is the victim of all possession crimes, each 
crime has its own nuances and must be evaluated on its own.  See 
United States v. Cousens, 942 F.2d 800, 808 (1st Cir. 1991) (a 
defendant "who purchased different firearms on different 
occasions for different purposes using funds from different 
sources, readily may be distinguished from a defendant who pleads 
guilty to three counts of unlicensed dealing in firearms") 
(pointing out limited utility of application note); see generally 
United States v. Griswold, No. 94-1979, slip op. at 9-10 (3d Cir. 
Jun. 5, 1995) (discussing application note). 
 Bush further argues that subsections 3D1.2(b) and (d) 
required the district court to classify the entire offense 
conduct as one group.  She contends that subsection (b) required 
grouping because "[t]he nature of the interest invaded by each of 
  
the ten counts in this case was exactly the same -- the interest 
in keeping guns out of the hands of convicted felons" and 
therefore "Bush's 'criminal objective' was also the same -- the 
possession of handguns."  Br. at 11.  She argues subsection (d) 
required grouping because Bush's behavior was "ongoing and 
continuous in nature."  Inasmuch as the arguments relating to 
both subsections are quite similar, namely that Bush's criminal 
conduct constituted one quick scheme of purchasing handguns, we 
will address them together.4 
 Other than the general principles detailed above, we 
are left with little direction from the Sentencing Commission.  
We take some guidance, though, from the limited case law 
addressing this issue.  In Riviere, the defendant pled guilty to 
                     
4
.  In Riviere we pointed out the following inconsistency in the 
Sentencing Guidelines commentary: 
 
 [T]he clarifying amendment, effective 
November 1, 1989, to the background 
commentary to the application notes to 
guidelines § 3D1.2 . . . provides that 
'[c]ounts involving different victims (or 
societal harms in the case of "victimless" 
crimes) are grouped together only as provided 
in subsection (c) or (d).'  However, the 
application note discussing the term 
'victim,' which appears in guidelines § 
3D1.2(a) and (b), provides that, for 
victimless crimes in which society at large 
is the victim, 'the grouping decision must be 
based primarily upon the nature of the 
interest invaded by each offense.' 
 
Riviere, 924 F.2d at 1305 (citations omitted).  This 
inconsistency does not affect our analysis, however, because as 
we state in the text, Bush's arguments regarding (b) and (d) are 
nearly identical. 
  
possession of a firearm by a felon, delivery of firearms to a 
common/contract carrier, and possession of an altered firearm.  
Relying on the general policies behind grouping, we held that the 
district court should have combined the offenses into a single 
group.  First, "[t]he guidelines already provided for enhanced 
punishment for possession of a firearm by a felon if that firearm 
was altered."  Riviere, 924 F.2d at 1306.  Thus, section 3D1.2(c) 
mandated grouping, because one of the counts "embodies conduct 
that is treated as an . . . adjustment to the guideline 
applicable to another of the counts."  Moreover, "grouping of the 
offenses of possession of a firearm by a felon and delivery to a 
common/contract carrier was required because to hold otherwise 
would provide enhanced punishment for Riviere's status as a 
felon, rather than his 'additional conduct that is not otherwise 
accounted for by the guidelines.'"  Id. at 1306.  Driving the 
analysis in Riviere was the fact that the defendant really pled 
guilty to one instance of unlawful conduct -- carrying altered 
firearms onto a chartered flight when he had been convicted 
previously of a felony -- and he should have been sentenced only 
once for his unlawful act; see Griswold, slip op. at 8 
("[B]ecause no additional conduct was represented by the 
additional counts [in Riviere], it was appropriate to group all 
of the firearms-related offenses.");  Cf. U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(a) 
(grouping appropriate when "counts involve the same victim and 
the same act or transaction"). 
 More analogous is United States v. Cousens, 942 F.2d at 
800.  In that case, the court held that in determining how to 
  
group firearms offenses, courts should consider "'differences in 
place, time, nature of the guns, lack of drugs, and intervening 
arrests.'"  Id. at 807 (citation omitted).  The court of appeals 
upheld the district court's decision to divide nine firearms 
counts into one group of seven counts, and two groups of one 
count each.  The offenses underlying the group of seven occurred 
during a nine-day time period, involved purchases from the same 
cash pool, and were connected by a common scheme.  The two 
remaining counts, however, involved, respectively, the purchase 
of a different type of gun from a different seller, and a 
purchase for a different purpose.  Id. at 807.  In response to 
the defendant's argument that all counts should have been grouped 
together, the court of appeals held that the defendant "did not 
demonstrate that his independent offenses . . . involved 
transactions connected by a common criminal objective or 
constituting part of a common scheme or plan with the grouped 
offenses."  Id. at 808; but see United States v. Wessells, 936 
F.2d at 168-69 (district court grouped several weapons purchases 
where the purchases evinced single schemes by the defendant "to 
supply himself with an arsenal"). 
 If the district court in this case refused to group the 
possession counts with their corresponding acquisition counts, we 
would face a Riviere problem -- Bush's sentence would be 
increased because of her status.  But this case is not like that 
at all; we do not face a situation in which the court sentenced 
her for discrete criminal acts from one instance of unlawful 
conduct.  Nor can the purchases in this case be compared to those 
  
leading to the single large grouping in Cousens.  To the 
contrary, the undisputed facts indicate that Bush made five 
specific firearms purchases over a period of several months -- a 
far cry from the nine-day period in Cousens.  And, contrary to 
the Cousens court's finding that the purchases were for a common 
scheme, Bush gave inconsistent explanations for her purchases.  
Furthermore, in light of the fact that we know little about where 
her firearms went,5 her explanations are fairly incredible 
insofar as they apply to all the guns.  While Bush apparently 
made all her purchases in cash from the same gun shop, there is 
nothing to indicate that the guns were bought from a particular 
cash pool to be used for a particular purpose.  In fact, there is 
nothing in the record demonstrating that the purchases were tied 
in any respect; indeed Bush's shifting explanations support the 
contrary conclusion.  In light of these facts, the district court 
probably would have acted well within its discretion had it 
inferred discrete motives from discrete purchases, and created 
five separate groups.  See Griswold, slip op. at 8 (discussing 
similar fact pattern) ("We remain unconvinced that the Sentencing 
Commission contemplated grouping these offenses."). 
 Ironically, Bush is taking the district court to task 
because it may have treated her more leniently than she deserved.  
Instead of rejecting her explanations and treating each purchase 
as a separate discrete act, the district court gave Bush the 
                     
5
.  One of the firearms was later found in the possession of a 
confidential informant in the World Trade Center bombing case.  
See app. 78-79. 
  
benefit of the doubt and believed her explanations in part.  And, 
the court added only one "mystery motive" to those explanations 
when it could have added two or three. 
 Nevertheless, Bush argues that the district court's 
"mystery motive" finding was clearly erroneous.  She contends 
that the district court concluded that the family "protection" 
motive could not account for all the purchases but that it based 
this conclusion on its erroneous belief that Bush had only one 
sister.  See Op. at 6 ("Bush . . . claimed to have purchased 
handguns . . . to give to her mother and sister for self-
defense").  Bush is correct in noting that the district court 
erroneously believed she had only one sister.  But the court had 
other justifications for inferring a mystery motive.  First, the 
protection explanation was inconsistent with the target practice 
explanation, so the court reasonably could have concluded that 
Bush was trying to hide a third motive.  Second, the district 
court plausibly was skeptical that a person would purchase semi-
automatic weapons simply for protection.  See app. 84 ("[W]hen 
somebody goes in and buys four semiautomatic weapons . . . it 
implies to me yet another purpose.  That's what I'm concluding as 
to the basis for this.") (sentencing hearing).  Finally, the 
undisputed evidence established that none of the weapons had 
reached the people Bush contended that they intended to protect.  
See PSR at 2 ¶ 10 (Bush "was unable to explain why the guns were 
never delivered to the intended recipients").  The district court 
was well within its discretion in concluding that there was a 
mystery motive. 
  
 Next, Bush argues that because her explanations 
"applied to all the guns she bought . . . [s]ince [she] never 
ascribed different explanations to different guns, these 
explanations simply cannot be used as a basis for creating 
separate groups."  Br. at 13.  We disagree.  The district court's 
finding must be examined in light of all of the evidence.  The 
record establishes both that Bush's husband was registered to 
shoot at Colosimo's Pistol Range, see app. 31, and that Bush has 
a mother and seven sisters.  In light of these facts, the 
district court could have believed that Bush's was telling 
partial truths each time she tried to explain the purchases.  
However, Bush's evasive behavior on other occasions belied those 
explanations.  When interviewed by the ATF in 1992, Bush "would 
not say where the weapons were" but implied that she knew where 
they were.  PSR at 2 ¶ 7.  When interviewed on April 26, 1994, 
however, "Ms. Bush expressed that she no longer knew where the 
guns were."  PSR at 2 ¶ 7.  Along with the inconsistent 
explanations she gave, Bush also told the district court that she 
did not know why she purchased the guns.  See app. 93. 
 Moreover, the district court's decision to divide the 
offense conduct into three groups is supported by the timing of 
the offenses.  Cf. Griswold, slip op. at 8 (improper to group 
"purchases and possession of eight semi-automatic handguns 
spanning in excess of two years.").  The chart we reproduce above 
demonstrates that Bush's purchases occurred in three separate 
bursts of activity.  The district court properly relied on that 
fact to support its finding of three motives. 
  
 The judgment of conviction and sentence entered on 
October 17, 1994, will be affirmed. 
                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
